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FRESENIUS USA, INC. V. BAXTER, INT'L, INC.
721 F.3D 1330 (FED. CIR. 2013)
I. INTRODUCTION

In Fresenius USA, Inc., v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit considered whether, under
the reexamination statute found at 35 U.S.C. § 307, the
cancellation of claims by the United States Patent and Trademark
Office ("PTO") was binding in pending district court litigation.'
Following a declaratory judgment action, the district court found
certain patent claims infringed and not invalid.2 The federal circuit
affirmed the decision, but remanded for the district court to
determine the scope of relief.' The district court awarded the
patent holder damages for infringement, but stayed execution of
the judgment pending appeal.' In the interim, the federal circuit
affirmed the PTO's reexamination determination that all asserted
claims were invalid.' The Federal Circuit held that in light of the
cancellation of the underlying claims, the pending litigation was
moot.6
II. BACKGROUND

A. Litigation
In April, 2003, Fresenius USA, Inc. and Fresenius Medical Care
Holdings, Inc. (collectively, "Fresenius") brought a declaratory
judgment action in district court against Baxter International, Inc.
and Baxter Healthcare Corporation (collectively, "Baxter")'
1. Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int'l, Inc. (Fresenius II), 721 F.3d 1330,
1332 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
2. Id. at 1331.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1332.
5. Id.
6. FreseniusII, 721 F.3d at 1347.
7. Baxter's '434 patent, "Method and Apparatus for Kidney Dialysis,"
discloses a hemodialysis machine integrated with a touch screen user interface
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alleging, inter alia, that claims 26-31 of U.S. Patent No. 5,247,434
("the '434 patent")', certain claims of U.S Patent No. 5,744,027
("the '027 patent"), and certain claims of U.S. Patent No.
6,284,131 ("the '131 patent") were invalid and not infringed.9
Fresenius
Baxter counterclaimed alleging infringement."
stipulated that its 2008K hemodialysis machine met every claim
limitation of the '434, '027, and '131 patents, but it asserted that
the patents' claims were invalid." In June, 2006, a jury returned a
unanimous verdict in favor of Fresenius, finding the relevant
claims of the '434 patent, as well as certain claims of the '027 and
'131 patents, invalid as obvious based on prior art.12 However, in
February, 2007, the district court granted Baxter's motion for
judgment as a matter of law ("JMOL"), finding that the jury's
determination of invalidity of the claims was not supported by
In October, 2007, the district court
substantial evidence."
on
damages, wherein the jury awarded
to
a
jury
trial
proceeded
that allows a user to monitor and control certain parameters. Fresenius USA,
Inc. v. Baxter Int'l, Inc. (Fresenius I), 582 F.3d 1288, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2009). In
1998, Fresenius introduced the alleged infringing device, "the 2008K machine."
Id.
8. FreseniusI, 582 F.3d at 1294. Independent claim 26 of the '434 patent
reads:
A hemodialysis machine comprising: (a) a means for controlling a dialysate
parameter selected from a group consisting of dialysate temperature and
dialysate concentration, and means for delivering the dialysate to a dialysate
compartment of a hemodialyzer; and (b) a user/machine interface operably
coupled to said dialysate-delivery means, the user/machine interface comprising
a touch screen adapted to display an indicium corresponding to a parameter
pertinent to operation of the hemodialysis machine for performing hemodialysis
and to permit the user, by touching the indicium, to cause a change in the
parameter.
Id. at 1293. Further, dependent claim 30 requires "a means for delivering an
anticoagulant to a patient wherein the touch screen further provides an indicium
soliciting input from the user corresponding to a rate of anticoagulant delivery.
Id.
9. Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc. v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., No. 03-CV-1431,
2007 WL 518804, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2007).
10. Id.
11. Id.at *2.
12. Id.
13. Id.at *8-13.
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$14.266 million to Baxter for infringement of the three asserted
patents. 4 In April 2008, the district court permanently enjoined
Fresenius from selling infringing machines, and ordered Fresenius
to pay ongoing post-verdict royalties." Both parties appealed to
the Federal Circuit.16
In September, 2009, the Federal Circuit reversed the district
court's JMOL decision as to the '027 and '131 patents, but
affirmed the JMOL grant as to claims 26-31 of the '434 patent. 7 In
light of the foregoing modification, the court vacated both the
injunction and the royalty award and remanded for the district
court to reconsider."
On remand, Baxter moved for a final
decision regarding the permanent injunction and ongoing royalty,
whereas Fresenius sought a new trial for pre-verdict damages of
the '434 patent. 9 In May 2011, the district court denied Fresenius'
motion for a new pre-verdict damages trial, and scheduled further
proceedings regarding the post-verdict royalties.20
On March 8, 2012, the district court awarded Baxter post-verdict
damages at a reduced royalty rate, and entered final judgment on
March 16, 2012 for Baxter.2' It ordered Fresenius to pay Baxter
$14.266 million plus-interest in pre-judgment damages, $9.3
million plus interest in post-verdict royalties, and costs.22
Fresenius appealed seeking a new pre-verdict damages trial, while
14. Fresenius1, 582 F.3d at 1294.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Fresenius I, 582 F.3d at 1297-99. Regarding the '434 patent, "Fresenius
failed to present any evidence - let alone substantial evidence - that the
structure corresponding to the means for delivering dialysate limitation, or an
equivalent thereof, existed in the prior art." Id. at 1299. Regarding Claim 30,
"substantial evidence does not support the jury's implicit finding that the prior
art contained a stepper motor means for delivering an anticoagulant." Id at
1300.
18. Id. at 1302-03. Regarding the royalty award, the district court was
instructed to "consider whether the previous award [was] proper in light of this
court's modification." Fresenius1, 582 F.3d. at 1303.
19. Fresenius11, 721 F.3d at 1333.
20. Id. The permanent injunction issue was moot as the '434 patent expired
in April of 2011. Id.
21. Id at 1333.
22. Id. at 1334.
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Baxter cross-appealed the court's reduction of the post-verdict
royalty. 23 On May 3, 2012, the district court granted Fresenius'
motion to stay execution of the new judgment pending the appeal
in FreseniusII, the present case.24 In doing so, the court rejected
Baxter's argument that it was entitled to enforce and execute on
the 2007 judgment.25
B. PTO
In 2005, concurrent with the pending district court litigation,
Fresenius filed ex parte reexamination of claims 26-31 of the '434
patent.26 In December 2006, the examiner made an initial
determination that claims 26-31 would have been obvious, and in
December of 2007, issued a final determination rejecting said
claims. 27 Regarding claim 26, the examiner concluded, inter alia,
that the "means for delivering the dialysate to a dialysate
compartment of a hemodialyzer" and other requisite elements of
the claim were present in the prior art.28 In doing so, the examiner
relied upon Lichtenstein, a reference not present before the PTO
during initial examination.2 9 Regarding claim 30, the examiner
relied upon a combination of references including Thomson and

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. FreseniusII, 721 F.3d at 1334. The court noted that "[t]he district court
explained that 'the March 16, 2012 final judgment appears to supercede [sic] the
Nov. 7, 2007[,] final judgment." Id.
26. See In re Baxter Int'l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The
PTO agreed that a substantial new question of patentability had been raised
considering new prior art references and granted the request. Id.
27. See Ex parte Baxter Int'l, Inc., APL No. 2009-006493, 2010 WL
1048980 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. Mar. 18, 2010).
28. Exparte Baxter, 2010 WL 1048980, at *5.
29. FreseniusII, 721 F.3d at 1334. The examiner concluded that "it would
have been prima facie obvious . . . to have modified [a] dialysis machine or the
dialysis machine of Lichtenstein, to utilize a touch screen . . . to control the

central processing unit microcomputer and machine [] for delivery of treated or
treatment fluids to a patient." Exparte Baxter, 2010 WL 104890, at *5.
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Lichtenstein in his obviousness determination.30 In the Fresenius
II decision, the court noted that "as we stated in In re Baxter, 'in
this case, the patent examiner relied on new prior art that had not
been raised [in the initial examination] or in the prior district court
proceeding." 3'
In March 2010, the Board of Patent Appeals and Inferences
affirmed the examiner's determination.32 The Board noted that
Baxter never argued during reexamination that Lichtenstein failed
to teach a "means for delivering the dialysate" nor that Thomson
failed to teach a "means for delivering an anticoagulant," despite
those elements being the two deficiencies that Baxter had
successfully shown from the prior art in the district court
litigation. Baxter appealed to the Federal Circuit, and on May
17, 2012, the court affirmed the PTO's rejection of claims 26-31 of
the '434 patent. 34 The Federal Circuit explained that its holding
was not inconsistent with its prior holding in the infringement
litigation because, unlike the district court, the examiner
sufficiently identified structures in the prior art that would have
rendered the claims obvious."
The PTO terminated the
reexamination and issued a certificate cancelling claims 26-31 6
III. DISCUSSION

The issue before the Federal Circuit on appeal was whether,
under the reexamination statute, the PTO's cancellation of the '434
patent's claims was binding in the pending district court

30. Id. "Thomson disclose[d] the administration of a secondary fluid such
as anticoagulant in administration systems operating under the control of
electronic instrumentation." Id. at *6.
31. Fresenius II, 721 F.3d at 1334. The court dispelled a notion of
inconsistency and further stated that the examiner "based [the] rejections on
prior art references that were not squarely at issue during the trial on the
invalidity issues, such as Lichtenstein and Thomson." Id. at 1335.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See In re Baxter, 678 F.3d at 1366.
35. Fresenius11, 721 F.3d at 1335.
36. Id.
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litigation." First, the Federal Circuit gave an overview of the
statutory grant of reexamination authority to the PTO, and
indicated that the "reexamination statute restricts a patentee's
ability to enforce the patent's original claims to those that survive
reexamination in 'identical' form."" Also, the court noted that the
language and legislative history of the reexamination statute
indicate that Congress intended reexamination to proceed
concurrently with litigation, noting that claim cancellation would
be binding on the concurrent litigation."
Baxter argued that the 2007 district court judgment conclusively
decided the validity of the '434 patent and Fresenius'
infringement, thus the cancellation of the claims, after such a final
judgment, could be given no effect in the present litigation. 40 The
Federal Circuit focused its analysis upon the concept of "finality,"
and concerned itself with whether the judgment in the
infringement case was sufficiently final so as to not be impinged
by the PTO proceedings and the later affirmation in its In re
Baxter decision.4 1 The court noted that while the judgment was
final for purposes of appeal, it was not "sufficiently final" so as to
preclude the final judgment in In re Baxter, and furthermore, it
noted that it had set aside the district court's judgment in the first
infringement case in FreseniusJ.42 Further, the court noted that its
remand decision in Fresenius I was not "sufficiently final to
prevent the application of In re Baxter in the pending suit." 43 The
court stated that its remand to the district court in FreseniusI did
not end the controversy between the parties or "leave nothing for
the court to do but execute the judgment;" instead, the court noted
several unresolved aspects of the district court's judgment, i.e.
37. Id. at 1336.
38. Id. at 1339.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1340.
41. FreseniusH1, 721 F.3d at 1340-41.
42. Id. at 1341.
43. Id. "To rise to that level, the litigation must be entirely concluded so
that [the] cause of action [against the infringer] was merged into a final
judgment . . . 'one that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for
the court to do but execute the judgment."' Id. (quoting Mendenhall v. BarberGreene Co., 26 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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"royalties on infringing machines, royalties on related disposables,
and injunctive relief."" The court stated that "where the scope of
relief remains to be determined, there is no final judgment binding
the parties (or the court)."45
The Federal Circuit next discussed its decision in Mendenhall,
wherein it held that a decision finding a patent not invalid but
remanding for further damages proceedings was not a final
judgment.46 In Mendenhall, the patent owner asserted its patents
against two alleged infringers in two concurrent suits.47 In one
suit, the federal circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that the
patents were not invalid, but remanded "for determination of
damages and other issues."48 While the first case was pending on
remand, the district court in the other suit ruled the patents invalid,
and the federal circuit "finally adjudged invalid" all asserted
claims."4 9 In light of the invalidation, the court in the pending case
gave effect to the intervening determination and reversed the
liability judgments and awards of damages.o
Baxter argued that Mendenhall's holding should only apply
where a patent has been invalidated by a district court; noting that
different standards apply in a PTO reexamination and a validity
proceeding in district court, Baxter argued that the patent's
invalidation in the reexamination should not have a collateral
estoppel effect."
The Federal Circuit dispelled the notion of
distinguishing between the "effects of a final, affirmed court
decision determining invalidity and a final, affirmed PTO decision
44. Id.
45. FreseniusII, 721 F.3d at 1341. The court noted that,
[ffinality will be lacking if an issue of law or fact essential to the adjudication of
the claim has been reserved for future determination, or if the court has decided
that the plaintiffshould have relief against the defendant of the claim but the
amount of damages, or the form or scope of other relief remains to be
determined
Id (emphasis in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §
13(b) (1982)).
46. FreseniusII, 721 F.3d at 1343.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. FreseniusII, 721 F.3d at 1343.
51. Id. at 1344.
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determining invalidity on a pending litigation."52 The court noted
that the latter was binding because Congress had expressly
delegated reexamination authority to the PTO, not because of
collateral estoppel." The court expressed that cancellation of
claims extinguishes the underlying basis of a suit based on the
patent; further, it stated that "Baxter's problem is that it no longer
has a viable cause of action in the pending case."54
Baxter next argued that allowing the PTO determination to
control the outcome of the pending litigation was an
unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers doctrine."
The court noted that Baxter's reliance upon Plaut was misplaced
because the suit was not over and there had been no final
judgment.56 The court stated that the controlling principle was that
an appellate court must apply the law in effect at the time it
renders a decision." The court indicated that the general rule, as
recognized in Plaut, controls regardless of whether "a plaintiffs
cause of action is 'extinguished' by the repeal of a statute or by the
PTO's cancellation of a claim pursuant to reexamination.""
Lastly, the court remarked that it had not reached the stage at
which Plaut precludes reopening a case."
In closing, the Federal Circuit held that the cancellation of 26-31
of the '434 patent belied Baxter's viable cause of action against
Fresenius, and that the pending litigation was moot.60 The court

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1344-45.
55. Id. at 1345.
56. Fresenius II, 721 F.3d at 1345. The court noted that, "[i]n Plaut, the
Supreme Court made clear that the power to issue a final judgment and thereby
conclusively resolve a case resides in the judicial branch; coordinate branches
cannot retroactively compel a case to be reopened." Id.; see generally Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
57. Id. at 1345.
58. Id. A cancelled patent "can no more be the foundation for the assertion
of a right after the surrender, than could an act of Congress which has been
repealed . . . [U]nless it exists, and is in force at the time of trial and judgment,
the suits fail." Id. at 1136-37 (quoting Moffit v. Garr, 66 U.S. 273, 283 (1861)).
59. Id. at 1345-46.
60. Fresenius I, 721 F.3d at 1347.
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vacated the district court's judgment and remanded
instructions to dismiss.6 1

255

with

IV. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS

The FreseniusH decision further incentivizes accused infringers
to seek recourse in the PTO. Correspondingly, the decision poses
a risk to patent holders insofar as it provides that an adverse
determination by the PTO can override previous favorable
determinations made during concurrent litigation. The court's
notion of "finality" may prove to be a contentious point, and it
potentially undermines district courts' efficacy in handling patent
By rendering non-"sufficiently final" judgments
disputes.6 2
susceptible to later PTO decisions, the Fresenius II decision puts
an acute emphasis on timing in patent litigation suits.
In Mendenhall, the court rejected the patent owner's contention
that the "proceedings [were] too far advanced for redetermination
of liability."" The timing of the intervening judgment in the
Fresenius H decision evokes a similar sentiment considering that
the PTO decision was given effect despite previous district court
and federal circuit judgments in Baxter's favor. Judge Newman
argued in her dissent that "[t]he issue of validity of Baxter's '434
patent was raised, litigated, and decided, with full participation of
[Fresenius]; it cannot be relitigated."" Judge Newman disagreed
with the majority's notion of finality and argued that preclusion
should apply to an issue that has been "finally decided in full and
fair litigation."65 Further, Judge Newman highlighted the fact that
the "remand had no relation to any issue in reexamination; validity
6 1. Id.
62. See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 733 F.3d 1369, 1372 (Fed.
Cir. 2013). Judges O'Malley, Rader, and Wallach, dissenting from the denial of
the petition for rehearing en banc, indicated that "the panel majority's decision
in this case goes a long way toward rendering district courts meaningless in the
resolution of patent infringement disputes . . . by creating a new regime wherein

a district court's final adjudication can be undone by later decisions of the
[PTO]." Id.
63. FreseniusII, 721 F.3d at 1353.
64. Id. at 1354.
65. Id. at 1355.
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had been finally resolved in the courts."'6 Following the Supreme
Court's denial of Fresenius' petition for certiorari after Fresenius
I, "Fresenius' liability for infringement, its failure to prove
invalidity, and its responsibility for past damages were firmly
established and beyond challenge [in court]." 6 7 The only live issue
concerned the scope of post-verdict relief.6 ' Going forward,
further elucidation regarding "finality" for purposes of issue
preclusion in patent litigation suits may prove beneficial. 9
From a tactical standpoint, the Fresenius II decision may
provide litigants with the impetus to quickly seek favorable
decisions in either PTO or federal court proceedings. Patent
holders may "race" to obtain a final judgment and damages in
district court whereas accused infringers will be incentivized to
move quickly through the PTO. Moreover, litigants may employ
dilatory tactics and appeal to the federal circuit to prevent an
adverse final decision in the interim. In an effort to limit costs,
litigants may prefer that judicial proceedings be stayed pending
concurrent PTO reexamination. Nearly 76% of reexaminations
filed since 1999 were in concurrent litigation."o With Inter Partes
Review proceedings slated to be completed within one year after
institution under the America Invents Act ("AIA"), conflicting
determinations in the PTO and concurrent litigation may become
more prevalent."
66. Id. at 1355 (noting that "all of the issues on appeal were finally
adjudicated by the Federal Circuit; the remand authorized the district court to
determine only post judgment royalties").
67. Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 733 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
2013); See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 559 U.S. 1070, 130 S.Ct.
2120, 176 L.Ed.2d 726 (2010).
68. Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 733 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
2013)
69. See Brief for The Biotechnology Industry Organization as Amici Curiae
Supporting Rehearing of the Panel Decision, Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter,
Int'l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Nos. 2012-1334, 2013-1355), 2013
WL 4713612.
70. See Inter Partes Reexamination Filing Data, U.S.P.T.O., available at
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/inter parte-historical-stats-roll up EOY20
13.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2013).
71. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(l 1) (West). The Director may extend the one year
limitation to 18 months under a showing of good cause. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION

Fresenius II held that the PTO's cancellation of Baxter's '434
patent claims belied Baxter's viable cause of action against
Fresenius.7 2 The federal circuit's remand decision in Fresenius I
was not "sufficiently final" so as to prevent the application of the
intervening In re Baxter decision in the concurrent litigation.
Deeming the pending litigation moot, the Federal Circuit vacated
the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to
dismiss. 74 This holding will further incentivize accused infringers
to seek recourse in the PTO.
Sean P. Quinn*

72. FreseniusII, 721 F.3d at 1347.
73. Id. at 1341.
74. Id. at 1347.
* J.D. Candidate 2014, DePaul University College of Law; B.S. Biomedical
Engineering 2011, Marquette University. I thank Professor Stefania Fusco for
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